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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
Criminal Procedure-PRELIMINARY HEARINGs-NONADVERSARY JUDICIAL
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE To DETAIN IS PREREQUISITE TO
EXTENDED RESTRAINT OF LIBERTY FOLLOWING ARREST.-Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975); In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure,
309 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1975).
In March 1971 Robert Pugh and Nathaniel Henderson were ar-
rested and subsequently charged by information. Both were held for
trial in the Metropolitan Dade County, Florida, Jail.' Pugh was denied
bail and Henderson was unable to post a $4,500 bond.2 Neither was
given a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause.3 They filed a
class action in federal court against Dade County officials. Plaintiffs as-
serted a constitutional right to a probable cause hearing as a pre-
requisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. The United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida held that in
direct information cases the fourth and fourteenth amendments man-
date a preliminary hearing on the question of probable cause, and
ordered that such a hearing be given immediately to the plaintiffs. 4
1. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 105 n.1, (1975). Pugh was charged with robbery,
carrying a concealed weapon, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a
felony. Henderson was charged with breaking and entering, and assault and battery. Id.
2. Id. at 105. Pugh could be denied bail because he was charged with robbery, a
crime punishable by life imprisonment. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 14 states:
Until adjudged guilty, every person charged with a crime or violation of municipal
or county ordinance shall be entitled to release on reasonable bail with sufficient
surety unless charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable by life im-
prisonment and the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption is great.
3. The Florida Supreme Court had consistently held that a preliminary hearing
to determine if probable cause exists to hold an accused for trial was not a prerequisite
to a criminal prosecution or to the filing of an indictment or information. See State
ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1972); Baugus v. State, 141 So. 2d 264 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 879 (1962).
4. Pugh v. Rainwater, 332 F. Supp. 1107, 1115 (S.D. Fla. 1971). The district
court also ordered the defendants to submit a plan providing for preliminary hearings
before a judicial officer empowered to act as committing magistrate in all direct infor-
mation cases. Id. at 1116. Subsequently a plan was submitted to the district court. It
was adopted with certain modifications. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla.
1972). In March 1972 the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit stayed the district
court's order pending appeal, but in the meantime the Dade County judiciary voluntari-
ly adopted a procedure similar to that ordered by the district court. The court of
appeals remanded the case to the district court for specific findings concerning the
Dade County plan. The Florida Supreme Court, however, had in the meantime amended
the 1967 version of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure concerning preliminary
hearings. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 1972). (The
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure were initially adopted in 1967, In re Florida Rules
of Criminal Procedure, 196 So. 2d 124 (Fla. 1967), and became effective on January 1,
1968.) The parties agreed that the district court should focus on the 1972 rules rather
than the Dade County plan. The district. court found the 1972 rules constitutionally
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The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.5 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorariO and in Gerstein v. Pugh7
held that the fourth amendment makes a judicial determination of
probable cause to detain a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty
following arrest," but that such a determination can be reliably made
without an adversary hearing.9
Prior to Gerstein, a Florida criminal defendant charged by a prose-
cutor's information did not have a right to a preliminary hearing on
the issue of probable cause.10 The rationale was that "[w]hen a prose-
cuting attorney files an information against a defendant, he conclusive-
ly determines that the evidence is adequate to establish probable
cause to put the defendant on trial."1
Mr. Justice Powell, writing for a unanimous 12 Court on the issue
of probable cause determinations, stated that "[b]oth the standards
and procedures for arrest and detention have been derived from the
Fourth Amendment and its common-law antecedents.' He found
the probable cause standard for arrest "a necessary accommodation
between the individual's right to liberty and the State's duty to
control crime." 14 Powell noted that "[t]o implement the Fourth Amend-
ment's protection against unfounded invasions of liberty and privacy,
the Court has required that the existence of probable cause be decided
by a neutral and detached magistrate whenever possible."' 5 Because
infirm in the critical area of probable cause hearings for persons charged by an informa-
tion. Pugh v. Rainwater, 355 F. Supp. 1286 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
5. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1973).
6. Gerstein v. Pugh, 414 U.S. 1062 (1973).
7. 420 U.S. 103 (1975). Gerstein was the only defendant to petition for certiorari.
Id. at 107 n.8.
8. Id. at 114.
9. Id. at 123.
10. The 1972 version of rule 3.131(a) stated in part: "A defendant, unless charged
in an information or indictment, has the right to a preliminary hearing on any felony
charge against him." FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(a), 272 So. 2d 65, 84 (Fla. 1972).
11. State ex rel. Hardy v. Blount, 261 So. 2d 172, 174 (Fla. 1972). See note 3 supra.
12. Justice Stewart, in an opinion joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall,
agreed that the Florida procedures at issue were constitutionally inadequate. He ob-
jected, however, to portions of the Court's opinion specifying those procedures for
determining probable cause that are not mandated by the Constitution. 420 U.S. at
126-27. See note 27 infra.
13. 420 U.S. at 111 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 112.
15. Id. Powell quoted Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948), as the
"classic statement of this principle":
The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not grasped by zealous
officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences
which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that
those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being
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"[t]he consequences of prolonged detention may be more serious than
the interference occasioned by arrest,"' 16 Powell concluded that "the
detached judgment of a neutral magistrate is essential if the Fourth
Amendment is to furnish meaningful protection from unfounded inter-
ference with liberty.
' ' 17
Looking at the 1972 Florida preliminary hearing procedure, the
Court found that a prosecutorial judgment of probable cause to detain
did not meet the requirements of the fourth amendment.' In calling
for a judicial determination of probable cause, however, the Court
did not specifically state who would be considered a judicial officer.' 9
The 1972 rules mandated preliminary hearings only for persons
charged with felonies.2 0 The trial and appellate courts found the ex-
clusion of misdemeanants to be a denial of equal protection. 2' The
Supreme Court did not specifically mention the plight of misdemean-
judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.
420 U.S. at 112-13.
16. 420 U.S. at 114. The Court noted that "[p]retrial confinement may imperil the
suspect's job, interrupt his source of income, and impair his family relationships." Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 117. Powell stated that "[i]n Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 5 (1927),
the Court held that an arrest warrant issued solely upon a United States Attorney's
information was invalid because the accompanying affidavits were defective." Id. In dicta
the Albrecht Court stated:
The information was filed by leave of court. Despite some practice and statements
to the contrary, it may be accepted as settled, that leave must be obtained; and
that before granting leave, the court must, in some way, satisfy itself that there is
probable cause for the prosecution.
273 U.S. at 5 (footnote omitted). See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
where the Court found that a probable cause determination made by the Attorney
General of New Hampshire was not equivalent to that of a neutral and detached
magistrate, since the Attorney General was actively in charge of the murder investiga-
tion and later was to be the chief prosecutor at the trial. Id. at 450. See also note 19
infra.
19. One commentator has argued that the Gerstein Court impliedly overruled
Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345 (1972), which held that a municipal court
clerk's issuance of arrest warrants for breach of municipal ordinances satisfied the fourth
amendment requirement that warrants be issued by a neutral and detached magistrate
capable of determining whether probable cause exists for issuance of the warrant. See
Rogow, Gerstein v. Pugh-The Supreme Court Speaks, 49 FLA. B.J. 205 (1975). (Rogow
represented the respondents in Gerstein.) But the Gerstein Court cited Shadwick in sup-
port of its argument that a prosecutor's law enforcement responsibilities are inconsistent
with the constitutional role of a neutral and detached magistrate. 420 U.S. at 117-18.
20. See note 10 supra.
21. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 788 (5th Cir. 1973); Pugh v. Rainwater, 355
F. Supp. 1286, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 1973). The district court, however, held that misdemeanants
accused-of violations that entailed no possibility of imprisonment could be denied a
preliminary hearing. 335 F. Supp. at 1290. The court of appeals held that such hearings
could be denied misdemeanants who were either out on bond or who were charged
with violating ordinances carrying no possibility of pretrial incarceration. 483 F.2d at 789.
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ants, but its holding clearly implied that any person held in custody
on a prosecutor's information must receive a judicial determination
of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty.
22
In addition, the 1972 rules set specific time limits within which
preliminary hearings were to be held.23 The district court and the
court of appeals held that different time limits for different offenses
violated the equal protection clause. 24 The Supreme Court did not
clearly respond to this issue.
25
Prior to Gerstein, Florida's preliminary hearing rule provided for
an adversary proceeding.2 6 In reversing the Fifth Circuit and holding
that the probable cause issue could be reliably determined without
an adversary hearing, 27 the Court distinguished the probable cause
proceeding required by the fourth amendment from a proceeding
where the standard of proof required of the prosecution approaches
a prima facie case of guilt.28 In the latter type of proceeding, the Court
indicated, adversary safeguards are necessary.2 9 The Court noted that
22. 420 U.S. at 114. Once it had determined that the fourth amendment required a
judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty
following arrest, there was no reason for the Court to make a distinction based on the
type of offense committed.
23. FLA. R. GuM. P. 3.131(b), as amended, 289 So. 2d 3, 4 (Fla. 1974), provided inter
alia:
In all cases where the defendant is in custody, except capital offenses or
offenses punishable by life imprisonment, the preliminary hearing shall be held
within 96 hours from the time of the defendant's first appearance. In all capital
offenses and offenses punishable by life imprisonment, the preliminary hearing shall
be held within seven days of the time of the defendant's first appearance.
24. Pugh v. Rainwater, 483 F.2d 778, 790 (5th Cir. 1973); Pugh v. Rainwater, 355
F. Supp. 1286, 1292 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
25. The Court recognized that each state should be free to experiment in the
area of probable cause determinations. 420 U.S. at 123. The Court stated that "[w]hat-
ever procedure a State may adopt, it must provide a fair and reliable determination of
probable cause as a condition for any significant pretrial restraint of liberty, and this
determination must be made by a judicial officer either before or promptly after arrest."
420 U.S. at 124-25 (footnotes omitted). The Court did not make clear whether a state
could continue to set time limits based on different offenses so long as the probable
cause determination was made either before or promptly after arrest.
26. Rule 3.131(a)(2) provided for the right to counsel; rule 3.131(d) provided for
summoning witnesses; rule 3:131(f) provided for the examination of witnesses by the
defendant; rule 3.131(g) provided for the exclusion of witnesses at the defendant's re-
quest; and rule 3.131(h) provided for a record of the proceedings. 272 So. 2d at 84-85.
27. 420 U.S. at 126. Justice Stewart, filing a concurring opinion in which Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall joined, found it unnecessary to "attempt to specify
those procedural protections that constitutionally need not be accorded incarcerated
suspects awaiting trial." Id. He was unwilling to join the majority's effort to "foreclose
any claim that the traditional requirements of constitutional due process are applicable
in the context of pretrial detention." Id. at 127.
28. 420 U.S. at 119-20.
29. Id.
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"as the hearing assumes increased importance and the procedures be-
come more complex, the likelihood that it can be held promptly after
arrest diminishes." s3
In discussing the nature of the probable cause determination, the
Court stated:
The sole issue is whether there is probable cause for detaining the
arrested person pending further proceedings. This issue can be
determined reliably without an adversary hearing. The standard
is the same as that for arrest. That standard-probable cause to
believe the suspect has committed a crime-traditionally has been
decided by a magistrate in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay
and written testimony, and the Court has approved these informal
modes of proof.
The use of an informal procedure is justified not only by the
lesser consequences of a probable cause determination but also by
the nature of the determination itself. It does not require the fine
resolution of conflicting evidence that a reasonable doubt or even
a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations
are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a
reasonable belief in guilt.3 1
The Court was careful to point out that while adversary safeguards
were not constitutionally mandated, they were not prohibited.3 2
Additionally, the Court stated that the probable cause determination
was not a critical stage in the prosecution that would require appointed
counsel.3 3
The Gerstein Court had effectively declared Florida's preliminary
hearing rule unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court, acting
30. Id. at 120.
31. Id. at 120-21 (footnote omitted).
32. Id. at 121-22. The Court recognized the impracticality of requiring adversary
hearings for pretrial detainees:
Criminal justice is already overburdened by the volume of cases and the
complexities of our system. The processing of misdemeanors, in particular, and
the early stages of prosecution generally are marked by delays that can seriously
affect the quality of justice. A constitutional doctrine requiring adversary hearings
for all persons detained pending trial could exacerbate the problem of pretrial delay.
420 U.S. at 122 n.23.
33. 420 U.S. at 122. In Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970), the Court held
that Alabama's preliminary hearing procedure was a critical stage in the prosecution.
Therefore counsel was required. In Gerstein, the Court distinguished Coleman by noting
that "under Alabama law the function of the preliminary hearing was to determine
whether the evidence justified charging the suspect with an offense. A finding of no
probable cause could mean that he would not be tried at all. The Fourth Amendment
probable cause determination is addressed only to pretrial custody." 420 U.S. at 123.
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under its constitutional power to prescribe rules of practice and pro-
cedure,34 filed amendments to the Florida Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure to meet the requirements of Gerstein.3 5 Florida's 1972 pre-
liminary hearing rule was completely rewritten. The new rule, entitled
"Pretrial Probable Cause Determinations and Adversary Preliminary
Hearings,"30 consists of two sections. The first provides for a non-
adversary probable cause determination, and is the Florida Supreme
Court's answer to Gerstein; the second provides for an adversary pre-
liminary hearing, and seems to go beyond the mandate of Gerstein.
Paragraph (a)(1)3 7 of the new rule relates to defendants in custody,
the subject of concern in Gerstein. The rule provides that all persons
in custody must receive a nonadversary probable cause determination
before a magistrate within 72 hours of arrest, unless the determination
is continued for up to 24 hours by the magistrate "for good cause." This
proceeding, however, is not required when a probable cause determin-
ation has been previously made by a magistrate and an arrest warrant
has been issued for the specific offense with which the defendant is
charged . 3  The rule also provides that the probable cause determina-
34. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
35. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 309 So. 2d 544 (Fla. 1975). The
amendments consist of a complete rewrite of the preliminary hearing rule (rule 3.131)
as well as minor amendments to rules concerning computation of time (rule 3.040) and
indictments and informations (rule 3.140). The court stated that the rules were
temporary in nature since they were promulgated under emergency conditions. Id. The
amended rules became effective on March 31, 1975. Id.
36. Id.
37. FLA. R. CPuM. P. 3.131(a)(1) states:
In all cases where the defendant is in custody, a nonadversary probable cause
determination shall be held before a magistrate within 72 hours from the time
of the defendant's arrest; provided, however, that this proceeding shall not be
required when a probable cause determination has been previously made by a
magistrate and an arrest warrant issued for the specific offense for which the
defendant is charged. The magistrate for good cause may continue the proceeding
for not more than 24 hours beyond the above 72-hour period. This determination
shall be made if the necessary proof is available at the time of the first appearance
as required under Rule 3.130, but the holding of this determination at said time
shall not affect the fact that it is a nonadversary proceeding.
38. Nonadversary probable cause determinations are required for persons arrested
and held pursuant to a grand jury indictment. See note 37 supra; cf. notes 46-48 and
accompanying text infra. The Gerstein Court pointed out, however, that a grand jury
indictment conclusively determines probable cause:
By contrast, the Court has held that an indictment, "fair upon its face," and
returned by a "properly constituted grand jury," conclusively determines the
existence of probable cause and requires issuance of an arrest warrant without
further inquiry. . . .The willingness to let a grand jury's judgment substitute for
that of a neutral and detached magistrate is attributable to the grand jury's re-
lationship to the courts and its historical role of protecting individuals from unjust
prosecution.
420 U.S. at 117 n.19 (citations omitted).
1975]
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tion shall be made at first appearance if the necessary proof is avail-
able.3 9
Paragraph (a)(1) effectively responds to the mandate of Gerstein:
the probable cause determination is now made by a magistrate rather
than a prosecuting attorney, and the filing of an information no long-
er bars a probable cause proceeding. In addition, the probable cause
determination is a nonadversary proceeding. The new rule makes no
distinction between misdemeanants and felony offenders.
4 0
In Gerstein, the Court noted that "pretrial release may be ac-
companied by burdensome conditions that effect a significant restraint
of liberty,' ' 41 and indicated that a probable cause determination should
be accorded persons released under those circumstances. 42 The Florida
Supreme Court responded to this concern by providing, in paragraph
(a)(2) of the new rule, that persons released on bail or recognizance
prior to a probable cause determination may file a written motion
for a nonadversary probable cause determination if they can establish
that the pretrial release conditions are a significant restraint on their
liberty.43
39. In Florida, first appearance must be held within 24 hours of arrest. FLA. R. CraM.
P. 3.130(b)(1). Therefore, the probable cause determination must be made within 24
hours if the necessary proof is available. It is conceivable that such a determination
could be made very shortly after arrest, since the standard for probable cause to detain
is the same as that for an arrest. See text accompanying note 31 supra. One commentator
has argued that the first appearance probable cause determination should be made
"within a few hours after arrest." Rogow, Gerstein v. Pugh-The Supreme Court Speaks,
49 FLA. B.J. 205, 206 (1975). Rogow implies that a first appearance probable cause de-
termination would be too late if made 24 hours after arrest. Id. at 205. He feels "that
even the bail decision should be preceded by a probable cause determination." Id. The
new rules had not been published when Rogow's article went to press.
40. See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
41. 420 U.S. at 114.
42. Id.
43. FLA. R. Cmal. P. 3.131(a)(2) states:
A defendant who has been released from custody before a probable cause deter-
mination is made and who is able to establish that his pretrial release conditions
are a significant restraint on his liberty may file a written motion for a nonadversary
probable cause determination setting forth with specificity the items of significant
restraint that a finding of no probable cause would eliminate. The motion shall
be filed within 21 days from the date of arrest, and notice shall be given to the
State. The magistrate shall, if he finds significant restraints on the defendant's
liberty, make a probable cause determination within 7 days from the filing of the
motion.
In Florida, conditions of pretrial release include release on bond or release on personal
recognizance. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.130(b)(4). In the federal system, pretrial release in non-
capital cases is governed by the Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1970), which
permits a judicial officer to impose certain conditions of release to assure the appearance
of the person for trial. Section 3146(a) states:
Any person charged with an offense, other than an offense punishable by death,
shall, at his appearance before a judicial officer, be ordered released pending
[Vol. 3
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The standard of proof required at the probable cause proceeding
is outlined in paragraph (a)(3). 4 4 In determining whether there is
probable cause to detain the defendant, the magistrate must apply
the standard for issuance of an arrest warrant. This provision complies
with Gerstein.45
Paragraph (a)(4) 4 6 responds to the Gerstein Court's concern with
trial on his personal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance
bond in an amount specified by the judicial officer, unless the officer determines
in the exercise of his discretion, that such a release will not reasonably assure the
appearance of the person as required. When such a determination is made, the
judicial officer shall, either in lieu of or in addition to the above methods of
release, impose the first of the following conditions of release which will reasonably
assure the appearance of the person for trial or, if no single condition gives that
assurance, any combination of the following conditions:
(1) place the person in the custody of a designated person or organization
agreeing to supervise him;
(2) place restrictions on the travel, association, or place of abode of the
person during the period of release;
(3) require the execution of an appearance bond in a specified amount and the
deposit in the registry of the court, in cash or other security as directed, of a
sum not to exceed 10 per centum of the amount of the bond, such deposit to be
returned upon the performance of the conditions of release;
(4) require the execution of a bail bond with sufficient solvent sureties, or
the deposit of cash in lieu thereof; or
(5) impose any other condition deemed reasonably necessary to assure ap-
pearance as required, including a condition requiring that the person return to
custody after specified hours.
Pretrial release conditions may be extreme even under the Bail Reform Act. See United
States v. Melville, 309 F. Supp. 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). In Melville, the defendant was re-
quired on each day to return to a place of detention at 6 p.m. and remain until 9 a.m.
of the succeeding morning, he was not permitted to travel outside Manhattan, and he was
not permitted even to enter railway stations and airports. Id. at 826.
44. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(a)(3) states:
Upon presentation of proof, the magistrate shall determine whether there is
probable cause for detaining the arrested person pending further proceedings.
The defendant need not be present. In determining probable cause to detain
the defendant, the magistrate shall apply the standard for issuance of an arrest
warrant, and his finding may be based upon sworn complaint, affidavit, deposition
under oath, or, if necessary, upon testimony under oath properly recorded.
45. See text accompanying notes 27-31 supra. In Gerstein, the Court stated that
"[t]he standard for arrest is probable cause, defined in terms of facts and circumstances
'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or
was committing an offense.' " 420 U.S. at Ill (citation omitted).
46. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(a)(4) states:
If probable cause is found, the defendant shall be held to answer the charges. If
probable cause is not found or the specified time periods are not complied with,
the defendant shall be released from custody unless an information or indictment
has been filed, in which event the defendant shall be released on his or her own
recognizance subject to the condition that he or she appear at all court proceed-
ings, or shall be released under a summons to appear before the appropriate
court at a time certain. Such release does not, however, void further prosecution
by information or indictment but does prohibit any restraint on liberty other
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the unfortunate side effects of pretrial detention.47 If probable cause
is not found or the specified time periods are not observed, the de-
fendant is either to be released from custody, or in the event an in-
formation or indictment is filed, released on recognizance or under a
summons to appear.4 8 The rule goes on to state that "[s]uch release
does not, however, void further prosecution by information or indict-
ment but does prohibit any restraint on liberty other than appearing
for trial. ' '4 This also accords with Gerstein; the Court had indicated
that a finding of no probable cause would not bar prosecution by an
information."0
After providing for nonadversary probable cause determinations,
the court went beyond Gerstein and provided for adversary preliminary
hearings under certain circumstances. Rule 3.131(b) gives those felony
suspects not charged in an information or indictment within 21 days
from the date of arrest or service of a capias the right to an adversary
probable cause proceeding.5' Therefore, a person arrested without a
warrant for the commission of a felony, and held 21 days without being
charged, will be eligible for both a nonadversary probable cause de-
termination and an adversary preliminary hearing.
The Gerstein Court stated that the standard for the nonadversary
probable cause determination was the same as that for arrest-"probable
cause to believe the suspect has committed a crime. '"52 The standard
than appearing for trial. A finding that probable cause does or does not exist
shall be made in writing, signed by the magistrate, and filed, together with the
evidence of such probable cause, with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction
of the offense for which the defendant is charged.
47. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
48. The Gerstein Court stated that a grand jury indictment conclusively determines
the existence of probable cause. See note 38 supra. The Florida Supreme Court, however,
has apparently decided that a grand jury indictment is no substitute for a judicial
determination of probable cause.
49. See note 46 supra.
50. 420 U.S. at 118-19.
51. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(b)(1) states:
A defendant who is not charged in an information or indictment within 21 days
from the date of his arrest or service of the capias upon him shall have a right to
an adversary preliminary hearing on any felony charge then pending against
him. The subsequent filing of an in-formation or indictment shall not eliminate
a defendant's entitlement to this proceeding.
52. 420 U.S. at 120. This arrest standard is delineated in two Florida statutes. FLA.
STAT. § 901.02 (1973) states:
A warrant may be issued for the arrest of the person complained against if the
magistrate, from the examination of the complainant and other witnesses, reason-
ably believes that the person complained against has committed an offense within
his jurisdiction.
FLA. STAT. § 901.15 (1973) states in part:
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for the adversary preliminary hearing is contained in paragraph (b)(5)
of the new rule.53 A comparison of the language in paragraph (b)(5)
with the standards for arrest indicates that an identical standard is
utilized in both proceedings. The only distinguishing feature appears
to be the increased procedural safeguards available at the adversary
preliminary hearing. However, the increased procedural safeguards
are somewhat offset by the rule's limited applicability-only persons
charged with a felony are eligible for the adversary proceeding. This
limitation may result in a denial of equal protection to misdemeants.5 4
In the final analysis, the Florida Supreme Court's amended rules
appear to comply with Gerstein. The nonadversary probable cause
determination should prevent abuses such as those seen in Gerstein, and
defendants not satisfied with the outcome can now seek review in a
higher court on a writ of habeas corpus.55 But the usefulness of the
adversary preliminary hearing remains to be seen. It could prove to
be an effective way for a timid prosecutor to shift the decision to
prosecute from the executive to the judicial branch in a sensitive
case-at the defendant's expense.
R. WAYNE MILLER
A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant when:
(2) A felony has been committed and he reasonably believes that the person
committed it.
(3) He reasonably believes that a felony has been or is being committed and
reasonably believes that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing it.
See Pegueno v. State, 85 So. 2d 600, 602 (Fla. 1956); Melton v. State, 75 So. 2d 291, 293-94
(Fla. 1954); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.120.
53. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.131(b)(5) states in part:
If from the evidence it appears to the magistrate that there is probable cause to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the defendant has com-
mitted it, the magistrate shall cause the defendant to be held to answer to the
circuit court ....
54. See notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
55. The Gerstein Court recognized that at common law the "initial determination
of probable cause . . . could be reviewed by higher courts on a writ of habeas corpus."
420 U.S. at 115. See Rogow, Gerstein v. Pugh-The Supreme Court Speaks, 49 FLA. B.J.
205 (1975). Prior to Gerstein, the Florida Supreme Court had held that the "use of the
writ of habeas corpus to test the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a charge may
have been based is not sanctioned .... ." Sullivan v. State ex rel. McCrory, 49 So. 2d
794, 797 (Fla. 1951). This rule, however, did not apply "where a person is held solely
under process issuing from a committing magistrate." Id. The rationale for allowing
habeas corpus review of a magistrate's probable cause determination was that "the
existence of 'probable cause' is a sine qua non to the validity of the magistrate's com-
mitment-it is essential to the magistrate's jurisdiction to make the commitment." Id.
Under the new Florida rule, all determinations of probable cause to detain must be
made by a magistrate. Therefore, habeas corpus review will be available under Sullivan.
